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Chantal Mou.ffe

determining in the last instance those things which in fact provide its conditions
of existence. So, one has to think in different ways. That is the conclusion we
came to in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy but it took some time to work
through. And of course, that is also linked to the critique which I ended up
making of Gramsci because I, in my previous work on Gramsci before Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, still agreed with Gramsci on the idea that only the
working class could provide the articulating principle of the new democratic
hegemony. I was trying to bring in the new .movements and the importance of
feminism and other struggles believing that there was some kind of necessary
centrality of the working class. That is something which we abandoned in
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
We came to abandon the idea that it was only the working class that could
provide the articulating principle of a hegemony. Of course, it does not mean
that in some countries it cannot be the working class. But in other countries it
can be some other group and sometimes there is not even an articulating
principle. Sometimes there is hegemony without an hegemonic center. For
instance, it might in many cases be a situation in which no particular group is
dominant. So, that is something I personally see as a break with my work on
Gramsci before Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. At that point my work really
became post-marxist because once you abandon the centrality of the working
class you are obviously post-marxist.

It does not mean I was rejecting everything of marxism. I still feel that there
are many important concerns about the struggle around class which are postmarxism's contributions to the formulation of a left perspective. In the same
way, feminism insists on the importance of the feminist question. I see very
much marxism as part of a wider project but not at all as providing the theory,
the master theory. And of course, I feel the same way with respect to feminism.
Feminism is one component in a much wider perspective on democratic
struggle.
disQosure: Are there any last comments? If there are not, there is one last thing
we would like to ask you. One gets the impression from listening and talking
to you that your view of radical and plural democracy is related to the
Trotskyian notion of a "permanent revolution". Could you clarify the difference for us?
Mouffe: No, it abandons the idea of revolution. In societies like the USA or
Western Europe, "permanent revolution" does not make sense because it
means transforming completely the very basis of society and I do not think we
need that. All the goals of radical democracy, and I would say even the socialist
goals in terms of the democratization of the economy, can be done perfectly well
within the current tradition.
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An Interview with Samuel Bowles
University of Massachussetts, Amherst
Conducted by Jeff Popke, Todd Lewis and Ccedmon Staddon
disClosure Editorial Collective
Lexington, Kentucky
February 27, 1993
This interoiew was conducted during a visit Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis made
to the University ofKentucky to give the lecture "Economic Democracy and Democratic
Organizations" as part of the 1993 Spring Social Theory Lecture Series sponsored by
the university's interdisciplinary Committee on Social Theory. It is divided into three
parts; the first dealing with concepts ofthe state and uneven geographical development,
the second dealing with the recent resurgence ofinterest in the ideas of civil society"
and the end ofhistory and the third with economic and political transition in Eastern
Europe.
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I. State, Power and Uneven Development

Popke: I think a good way to lead this interview off is to refer to the institutional
accommodations that you spoke of in Democracy and Capitalism. In the last
chapter you outline three distinct possibilities for the future articulations of
political and economic formations: "global-liberalism," which would entail the
worldwide growth of markets and capital mobility so as to erode national
sovereignty; "neo-Hobbesianism," which represents an expansion of hierarchical institutions of authority in the political sphere; and "postliberal democracy," which combines decentralized control of productive forces with democratic control of the economy. What can you say about contemporary conditions
and their dynamics, given these three models?
Bowles: Well, of these obviously the most vibrant power in the world today is
global liberalism. The spread of free trade as an ideology and set of social
policies is a powerful movement in the world today and it has found support
in a lot of historically unprecedented places. It has found strong support among
many Third World governments; as exemplified by Mexico's enthusiastic
support of the North American so-called free trade agreement. So I think that
global liberalism is the dominant tendency in the world today. It will pose the
dominant challenge to the Left, which will have to address the issue of
increased mobility of goods and services in the world. This will be a challenge
to find ways of continuing to express the hopes and aspirations of working
people in an arena in which capital is more than ever willing to use the threat
of mobility against populist and democratic movements.
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Popke: In fact, you have defined this mobility as one distinct type of power
conferred on capital. In Democracy and Capitalism you speak of three types of
power in particular: the first is command over production, the second is
command over investment, and the third is what you refer to as influence over
state policy, which capital holds by virtue of its mobility. Given the emphasis
you placed upon capital mobility and free trade in your previous answer, I
wonder if you see any checks to this sort of power over the state?
Bowles: Yes, I do. First, the power capital has over the state is gained not only
by dint of the threat of leaving, but much more directly simply by the use of its
financial resources to influence the outcome of political processes, both electoral and executive. Together, the interaction of money and politics and the
threat of mobility are complimentary; one greatly empowers the other. However, there are checks on that threat, so one ought not to exaggerate the viability
of the threat of moving. When corporations threaten to leave, say North
America, and head south to a country with low wages, they rarely do so. In fact,
three quarters of the assets of US firms outside of the United States are in North
America, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand-that is, they are not in
low wage countries at all. And two-thirds of the employees of US corporations
outside of the United States are not in Third World countries, they are in
advanced countries. In other words, many corporations are leaving the United
States to go to countries where on the average the wages and the rates of
unionization are higher than in the United States. The idea that somehow the
corporations are going to hold a gun to the head of local and national governments and say do it our way or we are going to walk" is not a credible threat
in the vast majority of cases.
/1

This is particularly the case now that the US is a relatively low wage
country among the advanced capitalist nations. There are now 12 countries in
which the average wage for manufacturing is higher than the United States, and
it is those countries that get the lion's share of investments by US firms outside
the United States. This is a fact that is very poorly understood by activists on
the Left and in the trade union movement who think that of course their jobs are
flying away to "Southern Somewhere". What we think of is the ads run in
industry newspapers, for example The Bobbin, a textile industry newspaper,
which shows a picture of Rosa Martinez, who works for 57 cents an hour and
is inviting you to come and employ her in El Salvador. That is the image that
we have of the mobility of capital, but in fact what it is doing is going to
Germany, where they pay their machinists $22 an hour. True, capital may well
move, but it may move to countries that have a better educational system than
ours, a better infrastructure, better labor relations, and indeed a better structure
of production in general.
The other thing of course is international finance. People are very misin-
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formed about the extent to which international finance is important. In
virtually every country over 90% of the investment is domestically financed. In
most countries it is more like 97%. In other words, very little depends on the
international flow of capital. But if the world really were a global-liberal"
ideal, the location of investment would be uninfluenced by the country of origin
of that investment. That is, there would be a mass of savings in the world and
there would be a large number of locations on w hich it might land, and there
would be no relationship between the source of the savings and the destination
of actual investment. Far from that situation, there is an extraordinarily strong
relationship between domestic savings and domestic investment.
/1

There are many reasons for this, though it doesn't particularly have to do
with transportation costs-if you try to predict where corporations go, distance
isn't really the main feature. There appear in fact to be trading blocks which
reliably predict where companies move. These arise, I presume, from concerns
surrounding the enforcement of contracts, the business climate, and information. There is good econometric evidence on location now suggesting that
things like education, a low level of risk, English language, and Latin America
arethethingsthatpredictwhere US firms go. Theinvestment processcontinu es
to be a profoundly national phenomenon. Corporations have not liberated
themselves from the state and have not liberated themselves from national
patterns. These patterns have a geographical aspect, but the geographical
aspect is of course a token of political and presumably military and other
enforcement aspects.
So, yes, there are checks on the mobility of capital, but the biggest check has
to do with politics. In the end, capital strike, the freedom of capital to move,
wouldn't be powerful if people felt they had an alternative, because the bottom
line for the labor movement is that when corporations move they don't mov e
the machines. Ask yourself what do they take? They don't take the skills, they
don't take the machines, and they don't take the resource base. What they do
is take pieces of paper, and if communities and nations and organizations of
citizens and workers were prepared, when the threat of leaving w as announced, they could counter that threat with "you can leave, but the factory
stays here and we are prepared to run it." If they could then gain the support
of local public financial institutions you would have a viable counter threat to
the threat of capital strike.
Popke: One of the justifications offered by proponents of the "global-liberal"
model is that it will tend to even the economic playing field. Capital will move
to places where it previously didn't exist, because of the comparative advantages of those areas, with the eventual result that regions and sectors will
approach a common economic standard. Your remarks here about the intrinsically national character of investment would seem to dispute this, and might
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instead support the arguments of David Harvey and others that contemporary
capitalism is by its very nature spatially uneven. Perhaps you could say of the
current contemporary capitalist accommodation that one of its features is this
sort of spatial differentiation.
Staddon: Yes, I was thinking along the same line-you know Harvey's
argument that the capital valorization proces.s, right at the heart of the beast so
to speak, involves the exploitation of geographical differences. In his view, the
construction of geographical differences from place to place, and the exploitation of those differences, is central to the process of capital accumulation.
Bowles: I could not establish a general tendency towards uneven development.
At the theoretical level, I don't think there is one. On the other hand, I think the
following is also true: in recent years, meaning the last thirty, there has been
undoubtedly a tendency towards disequaliz.ation of income between nations,
with the poorer nations falling behind and the richer nations pulling ahead. I
mean this literally; if you calculate a Lorenz curve for world income inequality
on the assumption that income within nations is equal, so we look only at
differences among nations, the Lorenz curve for the present is considerably
more unequal than the Lorenz curve for 1960. If you took China out of this
speculation, which one ought if one wants to look at the dynamics of capitalism,
then the tendencies towards disequalization in the world capitalist economy
are very strong.
On theoretical grounds, however, it seems to me that the exploitation of
geographical differences may lead to disequalization or it may lead to equalization. Certainly among a subset of countries we are seeing a very rapid process
of catching up. If you look for example at wage growth in major industrial
countries, wages in several east Asian countries are growing extraordinarily
rapidly, even as wages in the US keep on falling. So among the players who are
successful in the game we are seeing a process of equalization. On the other
hand we see Africa, parts of Latin America, and other regions falling further
behind in their wage levels. Note that when The Bobbin re-ran their Rosa
Martinez advertisement, her wages had actually fallen to 33 cents per hour.
One thing you might be able to establish at the theoretical level is that free
trade is often bad for workers. The reason for this is, very roughly, that the
ability of citizens to redistribute income through such mechanisms as welfare
state provisions, unemployment insurance and so on, and to protect themselves
from the power of capital depends upon electoral competition. Of course
voters' willingness to use these tools depends on the extent to which they think
that when they do use them they will not drive away capital. It is probably the
case that in the world today raising real wages will reduce employment in
national economies. That is, the higher the real wage, the lower will be the
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overall level of employment. In a dosed economy this might not be the case; the
more ~pen the ~conomy is to international supply and demand for goods the
more likely that is to be the case. So as economies become more open, the ability
of working clas.s organizations, social democratic parties and other parties of
the Left to push egalitarian state policies is increasingly constrained.

In particular cases this tendency of openness being bad for workers in both
rich and poor countries may be exacerbated. The North American, so-called
free trade agreement is a very good example. Here it seems likely that wages
in the US will fall as a result of the agreement with Mexico and that w ages in
Mexico will also fall as a result of the influx into Mexico of comparatively cheap
US grown com which will bankrupt Mexican farmers, who will then flood
Mexican cities with workers competing for jobs. Yet the total number of jobs can
only increase by significantly less than the growth in the number of job seekers.
So the arithmetic in this situation is that enough firms will move South to redu ce
wages in the US, but nowhere near enough to employ all the farmers w ho will
be bankrupte_d by the US com that is also going to move South. So the somewhat
improbable, but I think inescapable, conclusion is that freer trade and freer
investment flows between the US and Mexico will actually hurt the low end of
the income distribution of both countries.
There may be a lot of cases like the Mexico / US case. To the extent that there
are, then a general tendency towards geographical equalization would obtain.
And such a tendency may be the dominant tendency operating in the world
today. But I wouldn't want to try to establish it on theoretical ground because
clearly, Rosa Martinez, whether sh e works for 57 cents an hour or 33, wouldn't
have apayingjobatallifitweren'tforthefactthatsomecompany hadleftNorth
Carolina and employed her in El Salvador.
Lewis: I want to keep to the geographical theme, though perhaps intranational
unevenness might be a particularly interesting theme. Does it imply new forms
of politics and political actions?
Staddon: Yes, let's keep with the theme of geographical differentiation. While
there are certainly proces.ses of internationalization and globalization occur~g, these seem to be correlated with starkly opposing tendencies: namely, a
~qualization or fragmentation which creates pockets of places with very
different capital/labor, investment/ accumulation ratios, wage rates, productivity rates, etc. In fact we make a mistake ifwe perceive of uneven international
development as separate from uneven intranational development.

Bo~les: In other words, your hypothesis is that whatever is going on between
nations, within nations there is a disequalization associated with uneven
development between sectors of the labor market? This is certainly true for the
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US. It's much less true in Europe. In the US this has a lot to do with the decline
of trade unionism, the gutting of income support programs, particularly
unemployment insurance, as well as the other fall-back payment schemes, such
as AFDC, and so on. These defeats have had a lot to do with the increasing
segmentation of the US labor force.
One of the biggest challenges to activists on the Left is "Will the globalization
of production render the state ineffective in intervening to stop the process of
disequalization within countries?" The answer to this question is not in,
though there are a lot of negative feelings that not much can be done. But the
evidence is overwhelmingly positive rather than negative. There are a n umber
of very egalitarian countries which are doing very well in terms of economic
performance. And there is certainly no evidence that countries are invariably
forced into inegalitarian positions because of international competition. If you
look for example at trade shares-that is, which countries have gained most or
lost most in shares of world trade-those which are very inegalitarian, like the
US, have lost a lot. On the other hand, those countries which are highly
egalitarian are the ones who have gained most in shares of world trade. I'm
thinking not simply of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, which are very income
egalitarian in comparison to the US, but also of Norway, Sweden, and Austria
as well. All of these countries have far better trade share records than the US.
It doesn't seem to me that there is a lot of evidence for the argument that
egalitarianism in income distribution has been defeated by globalization. It's
possible, but we would then have to explain away the countries that I just
mentioned. It seems to me that rather than explaining them away, we should
learn from them and find out why in these countries' egalitarianism was
compatible with successful economic performance.
Staddon: One major empirical difference between countries like Norway and
Korea on one hand and countries like the US on the other, pertains to domestic
political structure. Fairly well vertically integrated national political states,
such as Korea and Norway, appear to contrast sharply with the US state-led
federalist model. Here in the US, with a less strongly vertically integrated
national state, the politics of development have adopted much more of a
"beggar thy neighbor" approach; where Kentucky's gain of Toyota Motor
Manufacturing is directly Ohio's or Tennessee's loss. This seems to breed, of its
verynature,asortof"zero-sum"politics, whichdirectlyreinforcesintranational
uneven development.
Bowles: Well, it may be that the kind of egalitarianism that works is that which
succeeds in fostering cooperative low cost solutions to conflicts. That kind of
egalitarianism may require a kind of communitarian base, which is possible or
likely in countries which have more homogeneous populations. If the secret of
Korea, Japan, Norway, Sweden then, is that they have relatively homogeneous
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populations, this is very discouraging to those of us who w ould like to see a
more pluralistic politics succeed. It is often said that egalitarianism works in
favor of economic productivity where you have a homogeneous population
and where egalitarianism can be the basis for trust and cooperation between
potentially conflicting parties. Where you don't have that communitarian basis
for cooperative solutions to potentially conflicting situations, you end up w ith
the sort of economically and politically disadvantageous fragmentation you
describe.
Ontheotherhand,Ithinkthatitisnotatallobviousthat thecommunitarian
basis of egalitarian policies has to be at the national level. There is for example
some evidence from the so-called Third Italy that it is precisely the community
base of these "third Italian" towns (such as Bologna) that has greatly augmented
their abilities to be very successful industrially. These towns also provide many
publicly funded services; from education to roads to training to the marketing
of goods produced by small industries. This has been a very effective industrial
strategy, and it is mostly based on Leftist local governments providing a
tremendous range of social services and infrastructure which then provides the
basis for a very entrepreneurial small-scale capitalism which works. That's not
all one could hope for in a good society, but it certainly is a viable future w hich
raises living standards in a way which is w idely shared.
II. Civil Society and the "End of History''
Lewis: In our discussion we seem to have converged upon the crucial linkage
between economic arrangements ai:id theories of politics and governance. To
continue with the latter: In classical political theory, "state" has been conceived
of as an institutional domain, mediating between civil society and economy .
But much recent political thought, which has come in the w ake of Eastern
European regime collapse, has suggested that civil society sh ould be theorized
as a domain of action or institutions that mediates between state and economy.
There is a seeming dislocation in the roles of state and civil society here. Given
the importance of governance issues in your thinking, could you share some of
your thoughts on the recent fascination with civil society or the reemergence of
civil societies?
Bowles: Citizens in the formerly totalitarian states find themselves bereft of
social networks, lacking that is, what in this country we call voluntary nonprofit organizations and the like, which provide the basis for personal and
political identities. They also provide a very important aspect of the delivery
of services, political expression, community formation, the construction of
identity and so on. When people talk about civil society in Eastern Europe what
they are hoping to create is nothing very remarkable or theoretically complex.
What they are looking for are the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts and they are
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looking for a Little League and all kinds Rotaries and Lions Clubs and organizations of hunters and sports fans and all the kinds of things that make a society
more multifaceted. These are a significant part of the evolution of an identity
and a political subject which is multifaceted and neither jingoistically patriotic
nor anonymously individualistic.
There is a terrifying possibility that the people of Eastern Europe will be left
in as alienated and anonymous a situation as people are in this country.
Ironically they see the US as a model because of the rather large number of
voluntary associations in this country, but then if that's what they want,
liberalism is not their answer. The th.r ust of the market and the thrust of liberal
ideology is to gradually undermine and erode the conditions favoring cooperation. This leaves people with a sparse menu of institutions to serve as a basis
for their identity: their families and their nation. It is rather distressing if these
are to be the basis for our solidarity with our fellow human beings. The future
of such a politics is very dismal indeed. However, I don't think that will be the
case. I suspect that other forms of identification will be sought and will be
found, including of course political parties.
Staddon: To pick up on the point that you just made, it does seem ironic that
many of the Eastern European countries, in elaborating their ideas about civil
society, look to the US as a model of a working civil society. The irony is that
in this country there are a number of social theorists-I'm thinking of Daniel
Boorstin, Louis Hartz and Daniel Bell-who look at the relation between civil
society and the state in terms of what Hartz called "The Genius of American
Politics"; that is to say, the way in which the relationship between state and civil
society has developed to the point where meaningful dissent is infinitely cooptable. This leads someone like Francis Fukuyama to revisit the venerable old
Hegelian chestnut that we have reached the "end of history," since we have
attained a political form in which political differences are ultimately assimilable
and therefore the historical contest between political collectivities is ended.
Bowles: This idea of the "end of history" is a cyclical fad. When I was at
university in the 1950s it was also thriving; the age of "isms" was said to be over.
At the same time I learned that the business cycle was over. The "end of
ideology" signalled by Daniel Bell was at hand. But no sooner had we learned
that the "isms" were all false anachronisms, when the 60s happened, forcing us
to take account of the fact that there remained many, many systemic differences
in the world. Now the conflicts of the 1960s weren't exactly the social conflicts
that those of us who by that time had become Marxists would have anticipated.
In this country for example while there were many class aspects of the social
conflicts of the 60s, race, gender and citizen/state relations were at least as
dominant. The same was true to varying degrees in other parts of the w orld.
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The idea that history has once again "ended" merely means that the
parameters that define what we thought was "history'' in the past, have
themselves become old fashioned. The ideology of the struggle between
capitalism and communism is probably the one that we can most securely lay
to rest. But the idea that the struggle between the class of people who own the
means of production and run most of the countries of the world, and the people
whodotheworkandgohometiredatnightmightbeoverispatentlyfalse. That
struggle hasn't ended and it won't end as long as the process of uneven
development continues. Given this process of global disequali zation, I suspect
that class, racial, national and gender differences in economic opportunity will
provide the basis for, but not determine the expr~ion of, political protest. And
this will make sure that history will be with us for some time to come.
Lewis: You suggest that what is commonly understood as "history" should
itself be rethought; that history should not conceived as a teleological principle.
Rather, perhaps the unfolding of social arrangements should be though of as an
uneven, nonlinear proc~.
Bowles: H history is a teleological process, it not only has not died, it probably
never was born. But what I really meant by the "end of history" is the end of
conflict among collective actors in history with the pos.sible outcome of these
conflicts being radical structural change. Now it seems remarkable that
anybody who has witnessed the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union in the last five years would say that history has ended, for we have just
seen one of the most dramatic chapters of history as I have just defined it. And
the fall of communism would not seem to exhaust the pos.sibilities of history as
long as we have an unjust world, confronting an environmental crisis; a crisis
which will be the basis of forms of collective action and collective struggles and
conflict which will be parallel with, and perhaps more important than, class
conflicts.
When people say that history is over, they often mean that the history that
Karl Marx defined is over, and they often mistakenly think that the absence of
groups identified as "classes" being political actors means that class conflict is
no longer taking place. There is a genuine source of confusion here. Liberalspeakhas become the lexicon of politics: "rights" arewhatyou use to assert your
position; this is true whether you are working class or whether you are lesbians
and gays or whether you're a dentist. Whatever you are, if you are a political
actor, you draw upon the discourse of liberal rights. That being the case it's not
surprising that some people have been confused into thinking that issues of
exploitation and domination in the workplace have faded into unimportance,
because the actors in asserting their demands as workers often sound more like
John Stuart Mill than Karl Marx. Nonetheless, the underlying dynamic of these
struggles often includes a class aspect, having to do with the process of
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investment, relocation of industry, choice of technology, wages, working
conditions and control over the process of production.

of all the capitalist countries in the world. Most of the other seventy-five are not
democratic by any stretch of the imagination.

III. Democracy and Transition in Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe the circumstances may be somew hat more favorable for
the emergence of democratic rule, because there you have very large and quite
well organized working classes, with an egalitarian ideology w hich will have
to be accommodated in the political process somehow. It doesn't strike me as
being unlikely that they would be accommodated through suffrage, presumably also through populist political organization, which might very w ell take
democratic forms. But one does not have in Eastern Europe the other part of the
co-evolution of capitalism and liberal democracy which has to do with the long
development of liberal rights and strong notions of privacy. It is a dis.W:bing
aspect of the Eastern European revolutions to see .the strong a:1ti-l~beral
tendencies of some of the emergent regimes on questlons of abortlon n ghts,
ethnicity and the treatment of gender issues. People on the Left often say that
the working class will be the loser in the rev olu tions of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Maybe not. The working classes may be the gainers from ~e
reformulation of their economies and the extension of democracy . Even so, it
seems very likely that women w ill be the losers in the revolutions in E~tern
Europeatleastin theshortrun becauseof theshiftinsocial policy aroundlSS~es
of gender, reflecting the anti-liberal cultural traditions in some of those societies.

Staddon: The third part of this interview concerns democracy and East
European transition. We are well past the first flush of excitement attending the
fall of Eastern European totalitarianism, and for many of these new gove:nments, the honeymoon is definitely over. For example, already we are seeing
the beginnings of the collapse of the original anti-comm~t c~alitions .. In
Bulgaria, where my own research is located, this fragmen~tlon IS occ~.g
very rapidly indeed. At the same time the process of econorruc restructuring IS
largely stalled. Yet there is still a prevalence, especially among western
scholars, to assume thatthe processes of democratization and marketization are
necessarily convergent. So let me start by asking, ''Do you perceive any
necessary connections between the processes of democratization and
marketization"? Someone like Adam Przeworski, for example, has argued that
in most Eastern Europe contingencies, marketization and democratization may
in fact be divergent and indeed contradictory.
Bowles: I think Przeworski is right in his generalconclusions, but let me go back
a bit and reframe the question. Capitalist markets and democracy coincide
historically. The question we have to address is, "Is there a logical affinity
between these two systems, in the sense that one either requires or supports the
other?" The spread of what I call democracy, which is universal suffrage in fair
elections and civil liberties, is a very recent phenomenon. It's a twentiethcentury phenomenon; no country in the world was democratic by my definition before 1900. Rather than seeing democracy as being a creation of the rising
emergent capitalist class and imagining somehow that the French Revolution
brought democracy to France (which is historically false), it is a better historical
account, I think, to see democracy, at least its culmination in universal suffrage,
as having emerged out of the struggle between capital and labor in the late 19th
and early 20th century. Under different historical circumstances the outcome
might have been different. Capitalism in the Third World has rarely stimulated
democratization and where it has it has not been by the same set of circumstances which obtained in Western Europe.

Staddon: This might be an interesting point for comment. I have recently been
involved in survey work in Bulgaria, in which we asked people a range of
questions about their perceptions of the proper relationships between ~estate
and the economic system particularly in terms of managing productlon, b~t
also in terms of providing consumption goods. The working hypothesis,
derived largely from Western literature, was that popular support for the state
as an economic actor would erode very rapidly, in support of some form of
~ez-faire. Strongly to the contrary, w e actually found that people couldn't
agree strongly enough with statements like-" the government should control
heavy industry" and "the government should ensure that there a~e a~equate
well paying jobs." And they couldn't express strongly enough ~err disagr~
ment with statements like "the government has no right to interfere with
private enterprise." These results initially seemed somewhat anomalous.

So there is every reason to believe that the relationship between democracy
and capitalism is permissive in the sense that it is clear that you can have a
capitalist and a liberal democratic society. It is not clear what other kinds ?f
economies can coexist with liberal democracy. Milton Friedmann is correct m
pointing out that we learn something from the co-existence of perhaps twentyfive capitalist economies and democratic states in the world. But we ~ho~d
remember that twenty-five democratic/ capitalist countries is a small rrunonty

Bowles: I have recently spent some time in Eastern Europe and in Russia
dealing with questions of economic reform and the social safety net as well as
new forms of labor-management relations. My impression is, .fro1:'- the trade
union and other groups that I have talked to there, that marke~tlon and ~e
market are primarily political slogans. They're slogans having to do w~th
reducing the irresponsible and unaccountable power of the state~ not w~th
as.signing a role for the state in accord w ith any w ell worked out lalSSez-faire
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economic program. The market is understood primarily as a weapon against
thenomenklatura. Butwhilethemarketissometimesaneffectivepoliticaldevice
for limiting the role of state bureaucracy, it is not a very effective way to
stimulate the process of economic growth. Rather, a combination of a highly
interventionist state along with markets used to discipline agents and weed out
firms that are failing is a strategy which appears to work well. That is the case
whether we are talking about the 'Third Italy" or South Korea. The idea that
somehow markets themselves will promote development is mistaken. It hasn't
been the case in the Third World and it's unlikely in the future to be the case
anywhere else.
What I hope is that the value of the market as a decentralized mechanism
for disciplining both governments and private economic agents will be appreciated in Eastern Europe. But in the reaction against programs of "shock
therapy" and market reforms, what we may find is a re-stabilization of the
Eastern European economies together with the protection of all actors from
accountability. In the end, it would be absurd for an egalitarian society not to
use markets as a means of the decentralized enforcement of standards and
accountability on its economic actors.
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between those two groups: one emphasizes the market as an arena of negative
liberty that ~.owed ~ou to say what the state could not do to you and the other
argues that it is precisely because people have rights that the state should take
care of th~m in distress, in bad luck or any other adversity. That's true, but
yo~ ll noti~e th~re are areas of the world which we admire precisely because of
their combination of an extension of rights against the state with an extension
of rights to expect direct material assistance from the state. The existence of such
countries would suggestthatKolankiewicz may be overly pessimistic. Take for
example the social democratic nations which have a very rich commitment by
the.sta~e ~ pro~ide. things to the citizenry and at the same time an ideology
which ts libertarian m other areas of life regarding what the state can do to you.
I don't see any intrinsic contradiction between the notion of the high level of
development of negative liberty in the area of social ~ues like sexual orientatio~, ci~il liberties, and freedom of speech combined with a strong element of
solidarity towards others when they are in distress. This can, I think, be
demonstrated by the successful cases of social democracy.
1

Our objections to markets primarily have to do with their inegalitarian
consequences where you have a very unequal distribution of property. The
new argument for markets is one which stresses that they are a way of
disciplining agents which is very difficult to corrupt, unlike states which are
quite eeiS}_' to corrupt. This is a powerful argument. Once we recognize that
market failures are prevalent, as in cases of environmental pollution and ought
to be corrected and that markets impose an inequality on society unless assets
are redistributed---once we recognize those two important caveats-markets
could be used effectively as an important device for selecting winners and
losers and thereby establishing accountability, but their role must be strictly
limited to that.
Staddon: The sociologist George Kolankiewicz has suggested that markets
seem to be based in the Eastern European context on the institution of civil
rights, what we recognize as the rights of the individual over and against the
state. Further he suggests that these civil rights will come in to clear conflict with
entrenched social rights; the rights concerning what people expect from the
state as opposed to their civil rights over and against the state. Have you any
thoughts on the potential conflict?
~owle~: Well, I spe~t some time in Prague working with a group of people
mc~uding :eform-~ded economists and solidaristic-minded people from

social service agencies. They were what we would call "social safety net"
agencies, and this tension which you describe could not have been more clear
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